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development perspective and, as such, tend to sanction small and medium enterprises
and individuals, while national governments are focused on a more punitive outcome,
targeting larger multinational corporations. This article examines the enforcement
objectives articulated in national legislation, namely the US Foreign and Corrupt Practices
Act and its Canadian counterpart, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, as well as
several Canadian cases, on the one hand, and the tools and outcomes of MDBs’ sanctions
systems on the other. We conclude that national enforcement efforts and MDBs’ sanctions
outcomes intersect in their fight against international corruption in that their results are
complementary; the former punishing large-scale offenders while the latter ensuring the
integrity of development projects.
Nous avançons que, même si les banques multilatérales de développement (« BMD ») et les
gouvernements nationaux disposent tous deux de mécanismes pour combattre la corruption,
les objectifs et les résultats de ces mécanismes coercitifs divergent. Les BMD s’intéressent
aux causes et aux effets de la corruption du point de vue du développement et, de ce fait, ont
tendance à sanctionner les PME et les particuliers, alors que les gouvernements nationaux
privilégient des résultats plus punitifs et ciblent les grandes entreprises multinationales.
Cet article examine les objectifs coercitifs mis de l’avant par les lois nationales, plus
particulièrement la Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act des États-Unis et son pendant canadien,
la Loi sur la corruption d’agents publics étrangers, de même que plusieurs cas canadiens, d’une
part, et les outils du système de sanctions des BMD et leurs résultats d’autre part. Il conclut
que les efforts coercitifs nationaux et le résultat des sanctions des BMD se rencontrent dans
leur combat de la corruption à l’échelle mondiale car leurs résultats sont complémentaires :
les premiers cherchent à punir les coupables d’importance alors que les secondes tentent
d’assurer l’intégrité des projets de développement.
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SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF THE US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)

in 1977, the world has witnessed the creation of a number of international
conventions, agreements, and national laws aimed at tackling international
corruption. The Organization of American States, the United Nations, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”),
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Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”),1 and an ever-growing number of
nations have adopted tools to address international corruption from diverse
angles. International treaties and agreements have aimed at enticing nations
to adopt anti-corruption legislation to forbid the bribing of foreign officials by
their nationals, while MDBs and national jurisdictions have created specific
tools to target international corruption. Although there seems to be unity of
purpose among these treaties, agreements, organizations, and nations, there are
some significant differences. National jurisdictions are interested in punishing
corporations and individuals for bribing foreign officials in an effort to protect
commercial national interest in the international market. MDBs, on the other
hand, are more interested in confronting the pervasive effect of corruption in
development projects in the countries they serve. These two objectives may
coincide in some instances, such as in the international bribery case of Canadian
construction company SNC-Lavalin, where the World Bank was interested in
the actions of this company in Bangladesh while the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (“RCMP”) looked into the company’s dealings in Montreal. But in
the majority of cases, MDBs are more interested in the causes and effects of
corruption in development projects in member countries2 than in targeting big

1.

2.

For the purpose of this article, MDBs refer to those MDBs that are signatories of the 2010
Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions or Cross Debarment Agreement.
These MDBs are the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the
Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) Group.
Member countries are the member states that own each of the MDBs. In the case of the
IDB, it is owned by forty-eight member states of which twenty-six are borrowing members in
Latin America and the Caribbean. The IDB was founded in 1959 as a partnership between
nineteen Latin American countries and the United States. Over the next several decades,
the IDB expanded its membership, initially through the Western Hemisphere. Trinidad and
Tobago became a member in 1967, to be soon joined by Barbados (1969), Jamaica (1969),
Canada (1972), Guyana (1976), the Bahamas (1977), and Suriname (1980). The twenty-two
non-regional or non-Western Hemisphere member countries joined between 1976 and
1986. Belize became a member in 1992 and Croatia and Slovenia joined as successor states
of Yugoslavia in 1993. The Republic of Korea became a member country in 2005 and
the People’s Republic of China became a member country in 2009. See Inter-American
Development Bank, “How Are We Organized,” online: <www.iadb.org/en/about-us/
member-countries,6291.html>.
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multinational corporations, leading to the sanctioning of smaller national or
regional corporations and individuals.3
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) and similar international
instruments aim at ensuring that all jurisdictions adopt legislation comparable to
the FCPA, outlawing foreign bribery across the board. As a consequence of the
enacted legislation, national anti-corruption enforcement systems are directed
at punishing offenders criminally or imposing fines and civil sanctions on those
entities that have violated national laws related to foreign bribery. In the case
of the United States, one of the main concerns for US authorities in relation
to bribery of foreign officials has been to “level the playing field” so that US
corporations can compete fairly abroad with other corporations.4 The United
States considers that international corruption takes away fair and competitive
business, inhibiting American corporations from doing business abroad. The
United States has decided to fight corruption to protect the ability of US
companies to compete on the global scale.5
MDBs have had a different thrust. They are concerned with the pervasive
effects of corruption in development in the countries and sectors they serve.
More specifically, MDBs are entrusted to ensure that the funds they have received
and administer are used only for the purpose for which they were intended:
Development. The creation of anti-corruption mechanisms is a tangible way by
which MDBs fulfill this fiduciary duty of ensuring proper use of funds.6 But most
importantly, it is one of the ways in which MDBs can ensure that communities
are properly served by projects sponsored by MDBs, making sure that funds are
not squandered or diverted. The key difference between MDBs’ anti-corruption
systems and those of national authorities is their objective. The purpose of MDBs’
anti-corruption sanctioning system is to ensure that the funds are not being
3.

4.
5.
6.

“Regional corporations” are referred hereinafter as Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”).
That MDBs are less interested in targeting big multinational corporations is not to say
that MDBs avoid investigating and pursuing leads related to alleged misconduct by large
multinational corporations. The size of a corporation is not one of the major parameters in
deciding what is investigated and/or who is sanctioned.
Roger P Alford, “A Broken Windows Theory of International Corruption” (2012) 73:5 Ohio
St LJ 1253 at 1272-73.
Leslie R Caldwell, Address (Remarks delivered at Duke University School of
Law, Durham, NC, 23 October 2014), online: <www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-duke-university-school-law>.
See Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, 8 April 1959, art III, s 1.
See also The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, 16
February 1989, art III, s 1.
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misused and to avoid doing business with entities or individuals who have been
found to have committed prohibited practices, including corruption.7 In other
words, the objective is to safeguard the developmental objectives of projects,
taking into account the communities that are being served and excluding those
actors who have demonstrated that they do not adhere to the ethical standards
expected in a development project.
Building on the historical context of anti-corruption mechanisms, this
article will explore the differences between the enforcement objectives of national
legislation, such as the FCPA and the Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act (“CFPOA”), on the one hand, and the tools used by MDBs on the
other, taking into account that both systems are aimed at fighting corruption. This
article builds on the notion that foreign bribery is a multifaceted phenomenon with
multiple victims and actors. Consequently, addressing corruption in international
development requires action and collaboration from all actors (national and
international) and the use of different legal tools. Criminal investigations, both
domestic and international, have to be complemented with MDBs’ international
administrative ones in order to achieve effectiveness. However, there has to be a
clear understanding of their differences and limitations in order to appropriately
measure success in each of the systems.
To that end, Part I of this article will explore the origins of the FCPA in
the late 1970s and how the statute was later transformed in the late 1980s. This
section will present a brief description of the history of the enforcement of the
FCPA. This will provide an understanding of the current purpose and objectives
of the US foreign anti-corruption system.

7.

A prohibited or sanctionable practice as defined under the Uniform Framework for
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption (the “IFI Framework”) includes: (1)
corrupt practice: “the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of
anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party”; (2) fraudulent
practice: “any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly
misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an
obligation”; (3) collusive practice: “an arrangement between two or more parties designed to
achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party”
(e.g., leaking of bid information, rigged specifications); and (4) coercive practice: “impairing
or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property
of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party.” See African Development Bank
Group et al, “International Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force” (September
2006), online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/FinalIFITaskForceFramew
ork&Gdlines.pdf>.
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Part II will concentrate on the development of the CFPOA and its history
of enforcement. Cases discussed will include Niko Resources,8 Griffiths,9 and
Karigar,10 each of which illustrates the implementation of the CFPOA as a
punishment and deterrence tool. This section will also examine two case studies
strongly connected to the international development context. The first is Acres
International, a Canadian civil engineering firm found guilty by the Lesotho
courts for corrupt acts but never prosecuted by Canadian authorities. The second
is SNC-Lavalin, which highlights an evolution towards greater enforcement
of the CFPOA and increased collaboration between Canadian authorities and
the World Bank.
Part III will explain how MDBs got involved in the fight against corruption
after 1996 and how they created and perfected an enforcement mechanism in
the first decade of the twenty-first century. Specifically, this section will address
the rationale behind MDBs’ involvement in the fight against corruption and why
this fight is international in nature. It will describe the different tools used by
the Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) and the World Bank to address
corruption in development projects. In order to illustrate the effects of corruption
in development projects and demonstrate the importance of the involvement of
MDBs in this field, two cases will be analyzed that will highlight the importance
of pursuing small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”).11 These cases will also
illustrate MDBs’ ultimate objective in fighting corruption.
In closing, this article will address the question of where national enforcement
efforts and MDBs intersect in their fight against international corruption. It will
also present the areas in which the objectives of the actions taken by national
jurisdictions and MDBs differ. Canadian and US authorities have concentrated
their enforcement efforts against sizable corporations with international reach,
while MDBs have concentrated their efforts on SMEs, which in the majority
8.
9.
10.
11.

R v Niko Resources Ltd (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 118, [2012] AWLD 4536 (Alta QB) [Niko].
R v Griffiths Energy International Inc (2013), [2013] AJ No 412 (QL) (Alta QB) [Griffiths].
R v Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093, 113 WCB (2d) 373 [Karigar].
The World Bank defines SMEs by the number of its employees. However, the World
Bank does not present a distinct number. It varies from 5 to 99 employees or even up
to 250 employees. The IDB defines small firms as those with 5 to 49 employees and
medium-sized enterprises as those with 50 to 499 employees. See Independent Evaluation
Group, “Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s Targeted Support for Small and Medium
Enterprises,” (7 January 2013), online: <ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/ap_
evaluationof_smes.pdf>. See also Arturo Galindo & Alejandro Micco, “Bank Credit to Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Role of Creditor Protection” (2005) Inter-American
Development Bank Working Paper No 527, online: <www.iadb.org/res/publications/
pubfiles/pubWP-527.pdf>.
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of cases are local or regional. This article submits that although the outcomes
are significantly different at the national level and at the MDB level, they are
complementary. However, measuring success in both instances relates to their
different origins and objectives, and, hence, drawing comparisons in enforcement
efforts could be misleading.

I. THE FCPA
In the United States, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) share the authority to enforce the FCPA.12
The DOJ’s jurisdiction covers criminal and civil enforcement of the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions in relation to domestic concerns, which include (1) US
citizens, nationals, and residents and (2) US businesses and their officers, director,
employees, agents, or stockholders acting on the domestic concern’s behalf.13 The
SEC is responsible for the civil enforcement of the FCPA against issuers and their
officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on the issuer’s behalf.14
Even though the DOJ and the SEC have the authority to enforce the FCPA, they
work in close collaboration with many other federal agencies,15 including the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).16 Collaboration between these agencies
has been a key to the successful prosecution of FCPA violations.
Although the FCPA was enacted in 1977 and amended in 1988 and 1998,
significant enforcement only began in the late 2000s.17 In the first few years
of the FCPA’s existence, the SEC tried only a few cases.18 Between 1978 and
2000, the SEC and the DOJ conducted less than three FCPA cases per year, on
12. US, Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice & Enforcement Division of the
US Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (2012) at 2-4, online: <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf> [FCPA Resource Guide].
13. Dieter Juedes, “Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense”
(2013) 4:1 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 37 at 40.
14. D Michael Crites, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at Thirty-Five: A Practitioner’s Guide”
(2012) 73:5 Ohio St LJ 1049 at 1058.
15. As an example, the Department of Commerce and the Department of State are working
to address corruption in other countries through anti-corruption and good governance
initiatives. In addition, both departments have assisted US corporations doing
business abroad.
16. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 12 at 4.
17. Mike Koehler, “Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era”
(2011) 43:1 U Tol L Rev 99 at 108 [Koehler, “Big, Bold, and Bizzare”].
18. Emily Willborn, “Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion in the FCPA: A
Call for International Prosecutorial Factors,” Note (2013) 22:2 Minn J Intl L 422 at 428.
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average.19 In contrast, in 2007, the DOJ had about sixty cases under investigation
or prosecution.20 In 2009, the DOJ secured convictions of fifty individuals for
FCPA violations.21 In 2010, seventy-four investigations were initiated and at
least eight FCPA-related settlements were reached.22 In recent years, the DOJ
and the SEC have demonstrated even more interest in investigating FCPA
violations.23 Since 2013, the DOJ has brought FCPA cases against twenty-one
corporations, charged or pled out twenty-five individuals, and obtained penalties
of approximately eight hundred million US dollars (“USD”).24 This change is the
result of multiple factors such as the increase of global business transactions, the
recent global financial crisis, and the multiple US corporate scandals.25
Although many corporations and individuals have been prosecuted as a
result of SEC and DOJ’s joint investigations, most of these prosecutions have
resulted in settlement agreements. Sanctions imposed by the SEC and the DOJ
made US corporations aware of the monetary and reputational consequences of
these investigations.26 Therefore, corporations prefer to settle or plead guilty once
they are faced with possible FCPA charges instead of enduring the prosecution
process.27 In the United States, more than 88 per cent of cases related to criminal
foreign bribery have been resolved by settlement, whereas only about 12 per
cent have proceeded to trial.28 Recently, Siemens, Ralph Lauren Corporation,
Tyco, Hewlett Packard, and ALCOA have paid millions of dollars to the US

19. Ibid.
20. Nelson D Schwartz & Lowell Bergman, “Payload: Taking Aim at Corporate Bribery,”
The New York Times (25 November 2007), online: <www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/
business/25bae.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.
21. Yin Wilczek, “SEC to Unveil FCPA Actions Against Individuals by Year’s End,” Bloomberg
BNA (10 October 2014), online: <www.bna.com/sec-unveil-fcpa-n17179896476>.
22. Juedes, supra note 13 at 41.
23. Priya Cherian Huskins, “FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch” (2008) 60:5 Stan L
Rev 1447 at 1449.
24. Miller & Chevalier Chartered, “FCPA Winter Review 2015” (22 January 2015), online:
<www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/MillerChevalierPublications?find=139809>;
Wilczek, supra note 21.
25. Juedes, supra note 13 at 41.
26. Ibid at 48.
27. Heidi L Hansberry, “In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the Dodd-Frank Act Has Created an
FCPA Monster,” Comment, (2012) 102:1 J Crim L & Criminology 195 at 197.
28. Jacinta Anyango Oduor et al, Left out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and
Implications for Asset Recovery (Washington: World Bank, 2014) at 34, online: Stolen Asset
Recovery Initiative <star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf>.
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government in settlement agreements.29 Other settlements reached between 1999
and 2012 resulted in the imposition of 6.9 billion USD of monetary sanctions
against corporations.30
However, the funds resulting from these settlements seldom return to the
nations that were affected by the bribes. The United Nations Convention against
Corruption (“UNCAC”) establishes as one of its fundamental principles that
assets should be returned to their countries.31 However, it is interesting to note
that only 3.3 per cent of the 6.9 billion USD in sanctions has either been ordered
to be returned or has effectively been returned to those countries where officials
were bribed.32 On the contrary, the monetary sanctions imposed have stayed
within the jurisdiction of those countries imposing the sanctions or where the
corporations are headquartered, such as the United States. Nearly six billion
USD in monetary sanctions have been imposed by bribe-originating countries.33
The fact that these funds have remained in the United States can be traced to the
history, goals, and objectives of the FCPA.
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FCPA

The FCPA was enacted in 1977 to address bribes paid to foreign government
officials by American corporations or individuals.34 In many cases, these payments
were made to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business.35 Prior to
the adoption of the FCPA, bribing foreign officials was not expressly prohibited
by US legislation.36 Although there were some laws to control improper activities
by Americans abroad, such as the Wire Fraud Statute and the Mail Fraud Act,

29. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases,”
online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml> [“FCPA Cases”].
30. Caroline Bradley, “Recovering the Proceeds of Crime” (2014) at 9, online: <blenderlaw.
umlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/intfinmats2014kleptocracy.pdf>.
31. United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, art 51 (entered into force
14 December 2005). Article 51 provides that “the return of assets pursuant to this chapter
is a fundamental principle of this Convention and States Parties shall afford one another the
widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.”
32. Oduor et al, supra note 28 at 67.
33. Ibid at 97-98.
34. The concept of individuals or corporations that could be subject to FCPA enforcement was
enhanced in 1988.
35. US, Department of Justice, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview,” online: <www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa>.
36. Scott J Lochner, “The Criminalization of American Extraterritorial Bribery: The Effect of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977” (1981) 13:3 NYU J Intl L & Pol 645 at 647.
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none addressed the payment of bribes to foreign officials.37 Due to the lack of
legislation to address this issue, payments made by many American corporations
to foreign officials were public knowledge.38 Evidence suggests that US
government agencies like the Department of State (“DOS”) and the Department
of Defense (“DOD”) were aware of these bribes and in some cases even provided
information regarding whom and how much to pay.39
The FCPA criminalized foreign bribery and created special accounting
provisions to address the corresponding accounting irregularities generated
by the payment of bribes (i.e., the resulting inaccuracy of corporate books
and records).40 Two main provisions are the driving force of the FCPA: (1) an
enforcement mechanism that criminalizes the payment of bribes to foreign
government officials, enforced by the DOJ41 and (2) an accounting requirement
to properly reflect transactions in order to help prevent corruption,42 designed
as a civil enforcement tool entrusted to the SEC.43 The first provision establishes
the criminal enforcement mechanism and prohibits US corporations to give
anything of value to foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining
or retaining business, with a broad understanding of jurisdiction.44 The second
provision, civil in nature and known as the books-and-records provision, requires
US issuers45 to establish and maintain internal controls, including accounting
37. Ibid at 648.
38. Ibid at 13; Tanya Rolo, “Retaking the Helm Against International Bribery: The
Facilitating Payments Exception and Sovereign Dominance” (2012) 35:6 Fordham Intl LJ
1884 at 1890-91.
39. Raymond J Dowd, “Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (1990) 14:4 Fordham Intl LJ 946 at 948; Lochner, supra
note 36 at 648.
40. Rafael A Porrata-Doria Jr, “Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Repeating
the Mistakes of the Past?” (1985) 38:1 Rutgers L Rev 29 at 30.
41. 15 USC §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3 (2012).
42. 15 USC §§ 78m-78m-1 (2012).
43. Francesca M Pisano, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Corporate Charity: Rethinking
the Regulations” (2013) 62:3 Emory LJ 607 at 613.
44. Gregory Kaler Smith et al, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (1991) 28:3 Am Crim L Rev 541
at 542. The FCPA has a broad understanding of jurisdiction and a sense of the extraterritorial
application of this law. For more on this issue, see Philip M Nichols, “Regulating
Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation” (1999) 24:1 Yale J Intl
L 257 at 290-91. See also Steven R Salbu, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to
Global Harmony” (1999) 20:3 Mich J Intl L 419.
45. The SEC considers a corporation an issuer if (1) it is listed on a national securities exchange
in the United States or (2) its stock trades in the over-the-counter market in the United
States and it is required to file SEC reports. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 12 at 11.
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standards (maintain detailed records, books, and accounts that reflect the real
transactions of the corporation), to avoid violations.46
The United States was the first nation to pass legislation that prohibits bribery
of foreign officials and sets clear rules regarding proper keeping of financial books
and records in relation to this type of activity.47 The US Congress had a number
of reasons to pass the FCPA, among which was to create an “alliance-building”
instrument between the United States and developing countries.48 During 1976,
prior to the enactment of the FCPA, the press exposed multiple corruption
scandals such as Watergate and Bananagate. These exposés led to congressional
hearings on the activities of US corporations abroad and investigations by
different agencies.49 The apparent widespread surge of corporate foreign bribery
and its exposure by Congress, the SEC, and DOJ investigations became part of
the motivation for Congress to enact the FCPA.50 Additionally, foreign policy
considerations, such as multiple bribes paid by American corporations operating
abroad that could have inadvertently linked bribe-payers to the US government
and the battle between capitalism and communism, were key factors in the
discussion that led Congress to embark on this effort.51
The Watergate scandal was perhaps one of the main drivers for the
enactment of the FCPA.52 President Nixon’s re-election campaign was subject
46. Pisano, supra note 43 at 613.
47. Eric C Chaffee, “From Legalized Business Ethics to International Trade Regulation: The Role
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Transnational Anti-Bribery Regulations in
Fighting Corruption in International Trade” (2014) 65:3 Mercer L Rev 701 at 714; Kristin
Isaacson, “Minimizing the Menace of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2014) 2014:2 U
Ill L Rev 597 at 599.
48. Andy Spalding, “Beyond Balance II: Rediscovering the FCPA’s Original Purpose” (26 January
2013), The FCPA Blog (blog), online: <fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/26/beyond-balance-iirediscovering-the-fcpas-original-purpose.html>.
49. Rolo, supra note 38 at 1892.
50. Preston Tull Eldridge, “Without Bounds: Navigating Corporate Compliance Through
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2013) 66:3 Ark L Rev 732 at 736.
51. See e.g. “Mr. Tanaka and Lockheed,” Editorial, The Washington Post (21 August
1976) A10 [“Tanaka”]. The editorial discusses the Japanese bribery investigation of
former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the payments received by the Lockheed
Corporation to persuade a Japanese airline to buy airplanes from the American
company. It warns of the perceived link between Lockheed as a bribe payer and the
fact that at the time it was the largest contractor for the DOD. See also Mike Koehler,
“The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2012) 73:5 Ohio St LJ 929 at
935 [Koehler, “Story”]; Michael P Tremoglie, “FCPA: Protect investors at home or
America’s image abroad?,” Legal Newsline (17 August 2012), online: <legalnewsline.com/
in-the-spotlight/237030-fcpa-protect-investors-at-home-or-americas-image-abroad>.
52. Koehler, “Story,” supra note 51 at 960-63.
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to an investigation for alleged illegal contributions by corporate executives.53
As a result, the SEC and the Attorney General’s Office conducted subsequent
inquiries into illegal payments made by US corporations.54 The US Attorney
General appointed a special prosecutor (the Watergate Special Prosecutor) to
investigate the legality of the payments made by US corporations to foreign
government officials.55 The Watergate Special Prosecutor and Congress directed
their investigation to determine the legality of these questionable payments.56
Following the Watergate scandal, the SEC also opened a series of
investigations. The SEC evaluated the payments from a different perspective than
that of Congress and the Watergate Special Prosecutor. The SEC investigation
concentrated on the fact that the corporations did not disclose the questionable
payments to their investors. The SEC tried to identify the mechanisms used by
these corporations to document the illegal payments in their books and records.57
The investigations by the SEC and the Watergate Special Prosecutors revealed
that hundreds of US corporations had spent millions of dollars bribing foreign
government officials.58 The inquiries exposed the use of secret slush funds to
make the illegal payments.59 In addition, these corporations had falsified their
corporate financial records, disguising or concealing the source and illegal use
of these funds.60
The Bananagate scandal was an additional consideration for the creation of
the FCPA.61 In 1975, the President and CEO of the United Brands Company, a
major importer of bananas to the United States, jumped from a New York City
building window and fell to his death.62 The suicide investigation revealed that
the CEO authorized payments to the President of Honduras to reduce taxes
53. Michael B Bixby, “The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010”
(2010) 12:1 San Diego Intl LJ 89 at 93.
54. Philip Mattera, “The New Business Watergate: Prosecution of International Corporate
Bribery is on the Rise” (18 December 2007), Corpwatch (blog), online: <corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=14859>.
55. Mr. Elliot Richardson acted as General Attorney of the United States during the Watergate
scandal. Once he became aware of the scandal, Mr. Richardson appointed Archibald Cox as
the Special Prosecutor for the Watergate scandal.
56. Koehler, “Story,” supra note 51 at 962-64.
57. Bixby, supra note 53 at 93.
58. Public Broadcasting Service, “Spotlight: History of the FCPA” (13 February 2009), online:
<www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-the-fcpa.html>.
59. Koehler, “Story,” supra note 51 at 932.
60. Ibid.
61. Isaacson, supra note 47 at 602.
62. Ibid.
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on banana exports.63 This scandal exposed, on the one hand, a practice used
by US companies to further their business agenda by paying bribes to foreign
officials and, on the other hand, the lack of legislation to prevent or punish this
type of conduct.64
The investigations of the Bananagate scandal led to the discovery of
questionable activities by the Lockheed Corporation.65 In 1976, after the
post-Watergate and Bananagate scandal investigations led by the SEC, the media
reported that US government contractors, including the Lockheed Corporation,
had bribed several government officials in Japan, Italy, the Republic of Korea,
and the Netherlands.66 Lockheed officials admitted paying bribes to Japanese
executives and government officials to promote Lockheed aircraft sales in that
country.67 The corporation argued that bribe payments were customary in these
countries.68 As a consequence of the Lockheed case, the former Japanese Prime
Minister, other Japanese politicians, and two former Italian defense ministers
were arrested.69 This led to public outcry in the United States, including a
stern editorial in the Washington Post in 1976 requesting concrete action by
US authorities.70
The US Congress also took foreign policy into consideration for the
enactment of the FCPA. Given that at the time the Cold War was in full force, US
officials feared that if examples of foreign bribery by US corporations—such as
63. Lena E Smith, “Is Strict Liability the Answer in the Battle against Foreign Corporate
Bribery?” (2014) 79:4 Brook L Rev 1801 at 1801.
64. Isaacson, supra note 47 at 603.
65. Smith, supra note 63.
66. Rolo, supra note 38; Lockheed Corporation, the largest US defence contractor, received at
the time a 250 million USD federal loan to keep the company out of bankruptcy. Therefore,
other countries perceived a close relation between the US government and Lockheed
Corporation. The public perception was that this money could have been used to bribe
foreign officials. The US government was very sensitive regarding the foreign perception of
the bribes. See Isaacson, supra note 47 at 603-604; Spalding, supra note 48.
67. Isaacson, supra note 47 at 603.
68. Ibid.
69. Josh Goodman, “The Anti-Corruption and Antitrust Connection” (April 2013) at 1-2,
online: <www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr13_
goodman.authcheckdam.pdf>. Based partly on these developments, the SEC established the
Voluntary Disclose Program for those corporations willing to self-report their wrongdoing
to avoid punishment. As a result of this program, SEC was able to collect information
regarding questionable payments of more than four hundred corporations for three hundred
million USD. See Rolo, supra note 38 at 1890-92. See also Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, “The
effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad” (2008) 39:4 J Intl Bus Stud 634 at 635-36.
70. “Tanaka,” supra note 51.
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defense contractors—were made public, it could reaffirm communist assertions
that the United States was made of greedy, socially destructive capitalists.71 The
US Congress gave special attention to bribery payments such as the ones made
in Italy and the political consequences that they could bring.72 The worry at the
time was that these bribes could threaten the credibility of the United States
as an advocate of democracy and jeopardize US alliances around the world.73
The United States decided that it was necessary to create legislation to address
ethical business practices related to bribery of foreign officials in order to build
and maintain economic and political alliances with developing countries and
represent its democratic values around the world.74 Congress resolved to foster
worldwide consumer confidence in US corporations by promoting morally
sound business practices by US corporations in the United States and abroad.75
Senator Frank Church and Representative Robert Nix76 held multiple hearings
to create an appropriate solution for this issue.77 Discussions focused on two
options: (1) establish a system of US reporting and disclosure to discourage
questionable payments and advocate for proper record keeping and accounting or
(2) criminalize bribes paid to foreign officials.78 The former implied that bribing a
foreign government official was legal as long as it was disclosed to US authorities.
This option was not considered to be the best approach.79 The US Congress opted
for the second alternative, creating a deterrence factor by criminalizing bribery
with directly enforceable measures.
Up to this point in time, it was clear that the FCPA owed its existence to
press exposés, the perceived wrongness of US companies’ actions abroad, and
the harmful foreign policy implications of this perception. However, it was US
businesses that helped transform the rhetoric of the raison d’être of the FCPA
to the widely used term “levelling the playing field,” influencing changes to
the law. In fact, the FCPA was modified twice after its inception, first by the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198880 (“OTCA”) and then in 1998 by
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Spalding, supra note 48.
Isaacson, supra note 47 at 604.
Pisano, supra note 43 at 613. See also Spalding, supra note 48.
Koehler, “Story,” supra note 51 at 951.
Isaacson, supra note 47 at 604.
Chaffee, supra note 47 at 710-12.
Lochner, supra note 36 at 649.
Ibid. See also Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 69 at 636.
Lochner, supra note 36 at 649.
Steven R Salbu, “Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act” (1997) 54:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 229 at 243 [Salbu, “Critical Analysis”].
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the International Anti-Bribery Act.81 The amendments introduced by the OTCA
extended the FCPA to cover issuers of securities, domestic concerns, and the
officers, director, employees, agents, or stockholders of either issuers or domestic
concerns. These modifications responded to concerns raised by American
corporations after the enactment of the FCPA.82 One of these concerns was that
the existence of the FCPA compromised American corporations’ competitiveness
vis-à-vis foreign businesses.83 Corporate America argued that foreign companies
were not subjected to the same guidelines and limits while operating abroad.84
Unregulated foreign competitors paying bribes were even allowed to claim these
payments as tax deductions.85 American companies complained that they risked
losing important sales, transactions, and investment opportunities due to the lax
stance of some foreign jurisdictions in relation to foreign bribery.86 For example,
until 1997 in some European countries such as Germany, businesses were allowed
to deduct bribes from their taxes as business expenses. Bribe payments were
deductible as “useful expenditures” for the company and commonly accepted as
a gentlemen’s agreement.87
This led the US Congress to entice foreign allies to adopt similar legislations.88
Specifically, the OTCA established the following:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of
an international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning
81. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-366, 112
Stat 3302 (1998).
82. Koehler, “Story,” supra note 51 at 975. of 1998
83. Bixby, supra note 53 at 98.
84. Ibid.
85. Salbu, “Critical Analysis,” supra note 80 at 243. See also Bixby, supra note 53 at 100, n 41.
86. Koehler, Koehler, “Big, Bold, and Bizzare,” supra note 17 at 108.
87. “The Siemens scandal: Bavarian baksheesh,” The Economist (17 December 2008), online:
<www.economist.com/node/12800474>; Interview of Josef Wieland by Dietmar H
Lamparter [nd] in “Verpfeifen kommt zuletzt,” Zeit Online (23 November 2006), online:
<www.zeit.de/2006/48/Siemens-Interview>.
88. Other amendments to the FCPA in that first reform included decriminalizing the failure to
comply with FCPA’s accounting requirements unless it was done “knowingly” in order to
avoid FCPA accounting requirements for issuers. One of the most interesting modifications
introduced by the OTCA was the decriminalization of facilitation payments. Under the
new legislation, it was no longer considered a criminal act to make payments to foreign
government officials who perform “ministerial or clerical” duties. See Bixby, supra note 53 at
98; Judith L Roberts, “Revision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill: Will it Reduce the Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact?” (1989)
1989:2 BYUL Rev 491 at 496-97. See also Salbu, “Critical Analysis,” supra note 80 at 246.
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acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments
made by this section. Such international agreement should include a process by
which problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved.89

In addition, the law required the President to report to Congress on
i. the progress of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 [above],
ii. those steps which the executive branch and the Congress should
consider taking in the event that these negotiations do not
successfully eliminate any competitive disadvantage of United
States businesses that results when persons from other countries
commit the acts described in paragraph (1) [above]; and
iii. possible actions that could be taken to promote cooperation by
other countries in international efforts to prevent bribery of foreign
officials, candidates, or parties in third countries.90
The OTCA made it clear that the FCPA may have created a potential trade
disadvantage and therefore the “playing field” for American corporations had to
be levelled. This was one of the precursors that led to the OECD Convention, as
the US government was mandated by Congress to pursue it.
The second modification to the FCPA occurred in 1998, as a consequence
of the creation of the OECD Convention.91 In order to align the FCPA to the
OECD Convention, the scope of the FCPA was expanded to include some foreign
nationals.92 In addition, the reform added an alternative basis for jurisdiction
based on nationality93 (FCPA anti-bribery provisions have extraterritorial
jurisdiction),94 empowered the DOJ to subpoena witnesses and documents in

89. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107 at 1424.
90. Ibid at 1424-25.
91. Bixby, supra note 53 at 100; Phil Underwood, “The OECD Bribery Convention
as Cover for US FCPA Enforcement Abroad” (28 March 2014), The Global
Anticorruption Blog (blog), online: <globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/03/28/
the-oecd-bribery-convention-as-cover-for-us-fcpa-enforcement-abroad>.
92. Bixby, supra note 53 at 100.
93. Mike Koehler, “FCPA 101” FCPA Professor (blog), online: <www.fcpaprofessor.com/
fcpa-101>. The nationality principle states “that the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions will apply
even if the conduct at issue has no U.S. nexus,” which means “that the FCPA can be violated
even if an improper payment scheme is devised and executed entirely outside of the U.S.”
94. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 12.
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certain civil investigations,95 and expanded the reach of US authorities outside
of US territory.96

II. THE CANADIAN CFPOA
As outlined in Part I, above, the FCPA was enacted in response to national
corruption scandals and allegations that US companies were paying bribes
abroad. These scandals and allegations precipitated a change in social attitudes
to favour the punishment and deterrence of domestic and foreign corruption.
They also prompted great concern in the US Congress about the foreign policy
implications of US corporations bribing foreign public officials. After the FCPA’s
enactment, US corporations advocated for the enactment of similar legislation
around the globe in order to “level the playing field,” a sentiment that was captured
by the US Congress in the OTCA, which resulted in the adoption of the OECD
Convention. Subsequently, Canada’s signature of the 1997 OECD Convention led
to the enactment of the Canadian CFPOA in 1999, twenty-two years after the
FCPA and eleven years after the OTCA. However, unlike the FCPA enforcement
in the United States, Canadian authorities have pursued only a handful of cases
under the purview of the CFPOA. As a reference point, the United States has
initiated more than 270 civil or criminal enforcement proceedings since 2007
under the FCPA, resulting in more than 6.9 billion Canadian dollars (“CAD”)
in fines.97 While Canada’s enforcement of the CFPOA may be in its infancy,
it has not gone unnoticed. It appears that as a result of Canada’s enforcement
actions in the past few years, Transparency International has moved Canada
from the category of “little enforcement” to that of “moderate enforcement,”
which includes countries that have initiated at least one major case and active
investigation.
Notwithstanding this limited enforcement, Canadian anti-corruption
efforts related to Canadian companies have been recently at the center of
anti-corruption advocates’ attention, particularly in light of corruption scandals
surrounding SNC Lavalin, which was debarred by the World Bank for bribery
in relation to the Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project in Bangladesh and which
is the subject of ongoing Canadian investigations in relation to its dealings in
95. “The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 Amends the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act” (26 March 2008), online: <corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/
the-international-anti-bribery-and-fair-competition-act-of-1998.html> (FindLaw).
96. Bixby, supra note 53 at 100.
97. Bradley, supra note 30; “FCPA Cases,” supra note 29.
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Montreal, Libya, and Tunisia.98 Furthermore, unlike its American counterpart,
the enforcement of the CFPOA has been subject to much criticism.99 The critiques
have focused primarily on the reticence of Canadian authorities to enforce the
existing legislation.
The CFPOA provides for Canadian jurisdiction over the bribery of foreign
public officials only when a listed offence has a real and substantial connection
to the territory of Canada. In other words, the offence must occur in whole or in
larger part in Canada.100 A close look at the CFPOA, in particular, section 3(1),
which defines the offence of bribing a public official, shows that the CFPOA’s
purpose is specifically the punishment of individuals who bribe or attempt to
bribe a foreign public official. Violation of the CFPOA is an extraditable offence
and is punishable, in the case of an individual, by imprisonment for up to
fourteen years with the possibility of fines imposed in addition to imprisonment.
This means that there is no availability of a conditional sentence or discharge
for the offence of bribing a foreign public official. The standard of proof for the
offence is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” since the offence is criminal.
Prior to the enactment of the CFPOA, there were several missed opportunities
to pursue corruption cases in Canada. One glaring example was the case of Acres
International (“Acres”). Acres, a civil engineering firm, together with Lahmeyer
International GmbH (“Lahmeyer”) (Germany), Impregilo SpA (Italy), and Spie
Batignolles (France), was found guilty by the High Court of Lesotho for acts
of corruption that occurred in the 1990s in relation to the Lesotho Highlands
Project.101 The court convicted Acres for bribing the chief executive in charge of
the eight billion USD Lesotho Highlands Water Project through an intermediary.
98. As part of a Negotiated Resolution Agreement between the World Bank and SNC-Lavalin,
the World Bank debarred SNC-Lavalin and over one hundred of its affiliates for a period of
ten years. Under this agreement, SNC-Lavalin and its affiliates committed to cooperate with
the World Bank’s Integrity Vice-President and continue to improve their internal compliance
program. SNC-Lavalin was investigated for misconduct involving a conspiracy to pay bribes
and misrepresentations when bidding for World Bank-financed projects, in violation of the
World Bank’s procurement guidelines. World Bank, Press Release, “World Bank Debars
SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its Affiliates for 10 years” (17 April 2013), online: <www.worldbank.
org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/world-bank-debars-snc-lavalin-inc-and-its-affiliatesfor-ten-years> [“World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin”].
99. See e.g. Transparency International, Exporting Corruption? Country enforcement of the
OECD anti-bribery convention, progress report 2012 (Berlin: Transparency International,
2012) at 16-17, online: <http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/
exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_the_oecd_anti_bribery_conventio>.
100. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34, s 3(1).
101. R v Du Plooy, [2003] LSHC 122 (Lesotho), Monopathi J.
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Masupha Ephraim Sole, the executive who had accepted bribes from Acres
and several other major international infrastructure companies, was sentenced
to fifteen years in prison on evidence obtained through a Swiss court order to
disclose Sole’s secret bank accounts. The conviction was upheld by Lesotho’s
Court of Appeal in 2003. The Lesotho courts efficiently took action and ordered
the parties to pay substantial fines.102
In 2004, the World Bank followed suit and promptly debarred Acres for
three years.103 The World Bank declared Acres ineligible to receive any new
World Bank-financed contracts for a period of three years. Following the Acres
trial, the World Bank also found Lahmeyer guilty of bribery. The World Bank’s
Sanctions Board104 found that Lahmeyer had used the same intermediary as
Acres.105 However, despite actions taken by Lesotho and the World Bank,
no prosecution was initiated in Canada. While it appears that Canadian law
enforcement authorities opened an investigation into the activities of Acres, the
civil engineering firm was never charged or prosecuted.106
Since the enactment of the CFPOA, Canadian law enforcement and judicial
authorities have pursued several notable cases. What is noteworthy about this
trend is that, much like Canada’s adoption of the CFPOA, its move towards
greater national enforcement of this Act appears to be the result of external
pressure from both the OECD and Transparency International. In March
2011, the OECD issued a report on Canada’s implementation of the OECD
Convention.107 The report, which came twelve years after the enactment of the
CFPOA, was quite scathing. Among other observations, the OECD Committee
found that Canada had only completed one prosecution since the enactment of
102. StAR – Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, “Lesotho Highlands Water Project / Jacobus Michiel
Du Plooy,” online: <star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/20073>.
103. The sanctions against Acres International by the World Bank came after the World Bank’s
Sanctions Committee had deemed that the case originally presented to them had no
sufficient evidence. The Sanctions Committee, based on the evidence presented in the court
cases, decided to reopen the case and sanction the Canadian firm.
104. At the time it was called “Sanctions Committee.”
105. Vinay Bhargava, “Curing the Cancer of Corruption” in Vinay Bhargava, ed, Global Issues for
Global Citizens: An Introduction to Key Development Challenges (Washington: World Bank,
2006) 341 at 345.
106. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2009: Enforcement of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (23 June
2009) at 22, online: Transparency International <www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/3rdEditionOECDProgressReport2009-2.pdf>.
107. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase Three Report on Implementing the OECD AntiBribery Convention in Canada (March 2011), online: <www.oecd.org/canada/Canadaphase
3reportEN.pdf>.
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the CFPOA. The Committee noted that there were twenty open investigations
and that credit for opening these cases should be largely given to the RCMP
International Anti-Corruption Unit, which had been established in 2008.108 In
2012, Transparency International issued its eighth annual progress report on
country implementation of the OECD Convention and once again criticized
Canada for lack of enforcement.109 It is interesting to note that after these reports,
in particular the OECD Report, the number of foreign bribery investigations
in Canada increased from twenty-three in 2010 to thirty-five in 2013. What
is equally important is the change in Canadian judicial attitudes towards the
punishment of foreign corrupt acts.
Prior to the case of SNC-Lavalin, three cases marked a shift in Canada’s
implementation of the CFPOA. The three cases that have received serious media
attention in Canada after the enactment of the CFPOA and the OECD Report
are Niko Resources,110 Griffiths,111 and Karigar.112 These cases show a distinct trend
towards a culture of national investigations, prosecutions, and punishment of
companies that engage in corrupt practices with foreign public officials.
In brief, in the summer of 2011, Niko Resources (“Niko”), an Alberta-based
oil and gas company, pled guilty to bribing a foreign senior public official in
Bangladesh, contrary to the CFPOA. Niko’s sentence was a 9.5 million CAD
fine and a three-year probation order, pending implementation of a compliance
program. Niko had paid the Energy Minister of Bangladesh 190 thousand CAD
to cover the cost of a vehicle for his personal use and trips to Calgary and New
York following an explosion at one of Niko’s natural gas fields in Bangladesh.
At the time of the payment, the Energy Minister had been in the process of
determining how much compensation was owed to Bangladeshi villagers for water
contamination and other environmental problems caused by the explosion. The
Canadian media hailed the decision as a “wake up call” to Canadian companies

108. Ibid at 5.
109. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Exporting Corruption? Country
Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report
2012 (2012), online: <issuu.com/transparencyinternational/
docs/2012_exportingcorruption_oecdprogress_en?e=2496456/2042485>.
110. Supra note 8.
111. Supra note 9.
112. Supra note 10.
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after Canada had been criticized for lax enforcement of the CFPOA.113 Media
sources also called the case “the most significant development in Canada’s efforts
to fight foreign bribery since the 1999 implementation of the CFPOA.”114
On 22 January 2013, another Alberta oil and gas company was in the
spotlight, when the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench ordered Griffiths Energy
International (“Griffiths”) to pay a 10.35 million CAD penalty after finding it
guilty of bribing a diplomat’s wife with two million CAD in order to secure
lucrative opportunities in Africa.115 Both Griffiths and Niko Resources involved
large companies whose primary business was oil and gas development. This is not
surprising given that Canada’s number one overseas industry over the past five
years has been oil and gas extraction.116
More surprisingly, both Niko Resources and Griffiths were heard and
determined by the same judge: Justice Brooker of the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench. Some may suggest that the decisions were the work of a vigilant judge
rather than a change in Canadian criminal policy. However, it is our view that
these two cases mark a move not only towards greater enforcement of the CFPOA
by the judiciary but also demonstrate the role of judicial interpretation as a tool
for punishment of corrupt acts by individuals and companies. This is illustrated
in part by the fact that in both cases the financial penalties imposed on the
companies were larger than the alleged bribes themselves. This marks a notable
shift towards punishment and deterrence as goals of the judicial system in this
context. What is absent from either of the decisions, however, is any reference
to the ill effects of corruption on international development or on the affected
country as a reason for the fines.
The third and most recent Canadian conviction was that of Nazir Karigar
in August 2013. Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice convicted Karigar for
conspiring to bribe Indian government officials with 450 thousand USD
following a failed attempt to secure an airline security contract valued at 100
113. Daniel L Kiselbach & Richard Truman, “Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials
Act: Niko Resources Ltd. Receives a $9.5 Million Fine for Bribery” (October 2011),
Miller Thompson Newsletter (blog), online: <millerthomson.com/en/publications/
newsletters/criminal-law-regulation-enforcement/2011-archives/october-2011/
canadas-corruption-of-foreign-public>.
114. John W Boscariol, “A Deeper Dive into Canada’s First Significant Foreign Bribery Case: Niko
Resources Ltd.” (21 November 2011), McCarthy Tetrault Publications (blog), online:
<www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5640>.
115. Griffiths, supra note 9.
116. Statistics Canada, “Exports of goods on a balance-of-payments basis, by product” (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2015), online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/
gblec04-eng.htm>.
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million CAD. Under this contract, Karigar would have supplied a security system
created by Cryptometrics Canada, an Ottawa-based technology company.117
Karigar was sentenced to three years in prison for conspiracy to bribe public
officials in India.118 The Karigar decision marks the first conviction against an
individual. Justice Hackland of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, relying on
section 3(1) of the CFPOA, stated that a serious sentence was necessary in that:
Canada’s Treaty Obligations as well as the domestic case law from our Court of
Appeal requires, in my view, that a sentence be pronounced that reflects the principals
of deterrence and denunciation of your conduct. Any person who proposes to
enter into a sophisticated scheme to bribe foreign public officials to promote the
commercial or other interests of a Canadian business abroad must appreciate that
they will face a significant sentence of incarceration in a federal penitentiary.119

Not only did Justice Hackland discuss deterrence and denunciation as the
underlying principles of the CFPOA, but he also took judicial notice of the
importance of international development goals when considering corruption
cases and appropriate penalties. To this effect, Justice Hackland stated:
[T]he corruption of foreign public officials, particularly in developing countries, is
enormously harmful and is likely to undermine the rule of law. The idea that bribery
is simply a cost of doing business in many countries, and should be treated as such
by Canadian firms competing for business in those countries, must be disavowed.120

This connection to the effects of foreign bribery in developing countries
became more relevant in the SNC-Lavalin case. In September 2011, the RCMP
raided the offices of Montreal-based SNC-Lavalin in connection with bribe
payments made during its bid to supervise the contractor responsible for the
construction of a multi-billion dollar bridge in Bangladesh.121 SNC-Lavalin is
one of the ten largest engineering and construction firms in the world, with
significant presence in developing countries and a long history of contracts with
international development agencies and MDBs.

117. Karigar, supra note 10.
118. Robert J Currie, “International and Transnational Criminal Law-First Canadian Trial and
Conviction Under Anti-Corruption,” (18 October 2013), International & Transnational
Criminal Law (blog), online: <rjcurrie.typepad.com/international-and-transna/2013/10/
first-canadian-trial-and-conviction-under-anti-corruption-law.html>.
119. Karigar, supra note 10 at para 36.
120. Ibid at para 8.
121. Samuel Rubenfeld & Joe Palazzolo, “Mounties Raid SNC-Lavalin In Corruption
Probe,” The Wall Street Journal (2 September 2011), online: <blogs.wsj.com/
corruption-currents/2011/09/02/mounties-raid-snc-lavalin-in-corruption-probe>.
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The Canadian authorities took action rapidly and in 2012 charged former
engineer Mohammad Ismail and former Executive Vice-President Ramesh Shah
with bribing officials in Bangladesh. They are awaiting trial in Toronto. The former
head of construction of the company was also arrested on charges of corruption,
fraud, and money laundering in connection with dealings in North Africa.122
On 17 April 2013, after a long investigation, the World Bank announced
the debarment of SNC-Lavalin and one hundred of its affiliates for ten years
following the company’s misconduct in relation to the Padma Multipurpose
Bridge Project in Bangladesh. This debarment was part of a negotiated
resolution agreement between the World Bank and the corporation.123 Under
the agreement, SNC-Lavalin and its affiliates committed to cooperate with the
World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (“INT”) and to continue to improve
their internal compliance programs. The debarment of SNC-Lavalin qualified
for cross debarment by other MDBs under the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement
of Debarment Decisions124 (“Cross Debarment Agreement”), which was signed on
9 April 2010. SNC-Lavalin’s debarment was consequently accepted by other
MDBs, including the IDB.
It is evident from the discussions regarding Niko Resources, Griffiths, and
Karigar that the case of SNC-Lavalin is not new. It is likely that due to its size
and international influence, SNC-Lavalin has received more attention than its
smaller Canadian counterparts. However, when looked at in context, this case
marks an evolution in Canadian investigations and judicial decisions towards
enforcement and punishment of individuals and companies under the CFPOA.
What is different about the SNC-Lavalin case is that it represents the first
122. Critiques of Canada’s enforcement measures should not be too severe. On 27 October 2014,
a Dhaka court acquitted all seven defendants accused of taking bribes from SNC-Lavalin in
connection with the Padma Bridge Project. See Richard L Cassin, “Bangladesh court clears
all Padma Bridge defendants,” (30 October 2014), The FCPA Blog (blog), online: <www.
fcpablog.com/blog/2014/10/30/bangladesh-court-clears-all-padma-bridge-defendants.html>.
123. “World Bank Debars SNC Lavalin,” supra note 97.
124. 9 April 2010, online: <crossdebarment.org/oai001p.nsf/0/F77A326B818A19C548257
853000C2B10/$FILE/cross-debarment-agreement.pdf> [Cross Debarment Agreement].
The participating institutions to the International Financial Institution’s (“IFI’s”) Cross
Debarment Agreement are the World Bank, the African Development Bank Group, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the IDB
Group. The Cross Debarment Agreement provides that, subject to the prerequisite conditions
set forth in the Cross Debarment Agreement, unless a participating IFI (1) believes that any of
the prerequisite conditions set forth in the IFI’s Cross-debarment Agreement have not been
met or (2) decides to exercise its rights under the “opt out” clause set forth in the IFI’s Cross
Debarment Agreement, each participating IFI will promptly enforce the debarment decisions
of the other participating IFIs.
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time that Canadian authorities have cooperated so closely with an MDB in an
investigation. In fact, the RCMP reportedly initiated its investigation at the
request of the World Bank Group (“WBG”), which had lent 1.2 billion USD
to the government of Bangladesh for the construction of the bridge and had
subsequently investigated and debarred the corporation in relation to this matter.

III. CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: THE
INTERSECTION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS AND
SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY MDBS AND THE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
The SNC-Lavalin case is perhaps one of the most salient cases in which the
collaboration between MDBs and national authorities materializes. However,
there are fundamental differences between MDBs’ enforcement efforts and those
of national authorities. At the national level, US authorities carry out criminal
and civil investigations in relation to foreign corrupt practices, while Canadian
authorities seem to carry out only criminal actions against CFPOA offenders. Both
systems conform to the mandates emanating from the OECD Convention. In the
case of MDBs, investigations and sanctions procedures are clearly administrative
in nature and rooted within the principles of global administrative law.125
To understand the differences between national systems and MDB systems,
it is important to track the origins of the fight against corruption in MDBs back
to 1996, when the World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, in a speech at
the annual meetings of the WBG and International Monetary Fund, provided

125. Pascale Hélène Dubois & Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, “Global Administrative Law and
the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law,” online: (2010) 36 Yale J
Intl L, online: <www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-dubois-nowlan-global-administrative-lawsanctions.pdf>.
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the first international acknowledgement that corruption was pervasive in
international development.126
The first investigative unit and administrative adjudicative system were
created at the World Bank in 1998 and were modified in 2002 after two reviews
conducted by Richard Thornburgh, former Under-Secretary-General of the
United Nations and former Attorney General of the United States.127 These
reviews were later complemented by the work conducted by an independent
panel (chaired by former US Federal Reserve Chair, Paul Volcker), which created
the World Bank’s current debarment and suspension system. In 2001, the IDB
adopted a system similar to that of the WBG. Thornburgh reviewed the IDB
system in his 2008 report.128 He recommended making the IDB’s system more
like the World Bank’s, and the IDB adopted his recommendations in 2010.129
Both the IDB and the World Bank’s systems were heavily influenced by
the suspension and debarment system of the US Federal Acquisition Regulations
126. James D Wolfensohn, Address (Remarks delivered at the Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption, Washington, 24 February 1999), online: <www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/11/06/090224b08319907a/Rendered/PDF/
Remarks0at0a0g0lfensohn00President.pdf>. Wolfensohn said:
It is true that when I came to the World Bank, I was given an admonition by our General
Counsel that I should read the Articles of the Bretton Woods agreements. In there it says I am
to deal with economic matters and that as an international civil servant, I should not, if I want
to keep my job, talk about political matters. I was then told that there was one word I could
not use, which was the “C” word, the “C” word being “corruption”. Corruption, you see, was
identified with politics, and if I got into that, I would have a terrible time with my Board.

Wolfensohn’s worry was later corroborated by a 2004 World Bank study that estimated the
amount of bribes paid worldwide to be “more than $1 trillion, or the equivalent of 3 per
cent of gross world product … .” See Vinay Bhargava, “Introduction to Global Issues” in
Bhargava, supra note 105, 1 at 16.
127. For the first review, see Dick Thornburgh, Ronald L Gainer & Cuyler H Walker, Report to
Shengman Zhang, Managing Director and Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Fraud
and Corruption, The World Bank: Concerning Mechanisms to Address Problems of Fraud
and Corruption (21 January 2000), online: <www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/05/000160016_20040805171318/Rendered/
PDF/29755.pdf>. For the second report, see Dick Thornburgh, Ronald L Gainer & Cuyler
H Walker, Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank (14 August 2002),
online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/thornburghreport.pdf>.
128. Dick Thornburgh et al, Report Concerning the Anti-Corruption Framework of The
Inter-American Development Bank (21 November 2008), online: <idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
getdocument.aspx?docnum=1824265>.
129. Inter-American Development Bank, News Release, “IDB moves to strengthen
anti-corruption framework” (8 December 2009), online: <www.iadb.org/en/news/
news-releases/2009-12-08/idb-moves-to-strengthen-anti-corruption-framework,6079.html>.

359

(2015) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

System130 (“FAR”). The FAR regulates the way in which US federal agencies exercise
their discretion in deciding which contractors to exclude from public procurement
on the basis they are not being presently responsible. The concept of present
responsibility provides the US government with the necessary tools to avoid
doing business with those contractors or providers that have not been responsible
in fulfilling “their legal or contractual obligations.”131 US federal agencies can
suspend and debar contractors deemed to be not presently responsible in order to
avoid future harm to the US federal acquisition system. Fraud and corruption are
two of the rationales for excluding contractors from participating in US federal
procurement. The purpose of the suspension and debarment system is to reduce
the “overall risk of harm to the procurement system.”132 In addition, suspensions
and debarments under the FAR apply across all federal agencies irrespective of
which agency declares a contractor ineligible.
MDBs adopted this concept of cross-agency ineligibility in 2010, when they
signed the Cross-Debarment Agreement, which allowed the signatories to recognize
one another’s debarment decisions. Under this agreement, all MDBs adopted the
same definitions of sanctionable practices (corrupt practice, fraudulent practice,
collusive practice, and coercive practice).133 Similarly, the MDBs also agreed upon
general principles and guidelines for imposing sanctions, and they harmonized
the principles for the treatment of corporate groups. However, there has been
no harmonization of the sanctions procedures utilized by the MDBs to impose
debarments and suspensions.
A. MDBS’ MAIN CONCERN IN RELATION TO CORRUPTION IN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND TOOLS TO ADDRESS IT

The World Bank and the IDB’s enforcement of the anti-corruption provisions
included in Bank-financed activities has been growing since 2003. Today, the
130. 48 CFR (2005). The Foreword states that
[t]he FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal Executive agencies in their acquisition
of supplies and services with appropriated funds. It became effective on April 1, 1984, and
is issued within applicable laws under the joint authorities of the Administrator of General
Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, under the broad policy guidelines of the Administrator, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget (ibid).

131. Pascale Hélène Dubois, “Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud
& Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank’s
Sanctions System” [2012] U Chicago Legal F 195 at 198.
132. Ibid at 198-99.
133. Caldwell, supra note 5.
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number of cross-debarred entities exceeds five hundred. This number does not
include many other debarred entities that do not qualify for cross-debarment.
However, most investigations undertaken by MDBs are of SMEs in the context
of the development projects that MDBs finance. Fewer investigations are of
large international corporations headquartered in developed nations, such
as SNC-Lavalin.
A recent case in Latin America that exemplifies the type of SME that is
debarred by MDBs and the impact of corruption on the poor can be found
in El Salvador. In 2009, the IDB financed a housing project for a vulnerable
community located near a river in San Salvador.134 The community lacked roads,
housing, water, and sanitation.135 The executing agency opened a bidding process
for the construction of the needed infrastructure and awarded the contract to
a local SME.136 During the construction process, the executing agency found
that the SME had submitted an invoice for works that had not been performed
in accordance with the contract. The executing agency also discovered that the
certificate of execution issued by a project supervisor misrepresented the progress
of the construction.137 Construction was subsequently stopped for more than
seven months, and ultimately the project was never finished. The families that
were the beneficiaries of the project had to be moved from their shelters to
the unfinished houses, where, according to news reports, they were exposed to
adverse weather conditions, resulting in children getting sick.138
The IDB investigated and sanctioned the SME, debarring the company
and its legal representative for thirteen years and the project supervisor and the
consultant to the executing agency for nine years. These sanctions were subject
to cross-debarment, and the company and individuals were declared ineligible to
participate in projects financed by the World Bank.
MDBs have also used other tools to address the adverse effects of corruption
in development projects. In addition to traditional investigations, the World
134. Karla Argueta, “Proyecto Nuevos Mejicanos a juicio en Corte de Cuentas,” El Salvador
(7 March 2011), online: <archivo.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.
asp?idCat=6329&idArt=5638593>.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Karla Argueta, “Nuevos Mejicanos: abandonado y familias viviendo en riesgo,” El Salvador
(13 December 2010), online: <archivo.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.
asp?idCat=6358&idArt=5400582>.
138. Karla Argueta, “La espera es larga… y el trabajo es poco,” El Salvador (7
March 2011), online: <archivo.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.
asp?idCat=6358&idArt=5638595>.
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Bank, through the INT, has conducted wide portfolio reviews known variously as
“proactive diagnostic tools” or Detailed Implementation Reviews (“DIRs”). These
reviews have covered World Bank operations in India,139 Vietnam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Kenya. Perhaps the best-known review is the India DIR due to its
political implications in that country. The Cambodia DIR was also important,
having direct measurable effects on the way the Cambodian government conducts
business. The Cambodia DIR also showed the commitment of an MDB to
development as the primary goal in fighting corruption.
An important aspect of the Cambodia DIR is that it produced actionable
information for the INT to start some investigations into certain SMEs. As an
example, on 2 April 2010, the World Bank debarred a Cambodian construction
SME, Royal Mekong Construction and Development Pte, and its director Heng
Rathpiseth for engaging in fraudulent practices related to the projects that were
under investigation in Cambodia. The two respondents were declared ineligible
to bid on World Bank projects for two years.140 Despite the relatively small size of
the companies under investigation, the DIR had great ramifications.
In 2004, the World Bank’s regional staff in Cambodia raised some concerns
about corruption in World Bank-financed projects.141 During the second half of
that year, INT started to address these concerns together with the government of
Cambodia by conducting a Fiduciary Review.142 As a result of this exercise, INT
139. World Bank Group, Department of Institutional Integrity, Detailed Implementation Review:
India Health Sector 2006-2007, vol 1 (Washington: World Bank Group, 2007), online:
<siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOII/Resources/WB250_Web_Vol1_012408.pdf>;
World Bank Group, Department of Institutional Integrity, Detailed Implementation Review
India Health Sector 2006-2007, vol 2 (Washington: World Bank Group, 2007), online:
<siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOII/Resources/WB250_Web_Vol2_012408.pdf>.
See also World Bank Group, Department of Institutional Integrity, Annual Integrity Report
2005-2006 (Washington: World Bank Group, 2006) at 16, online: <siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTDOII/Resources/complete.pdf>.
140. The World Bank, Press Release, “World Bank Debars Royal Mekong Construction” (2
April 2010), online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Mekong_and_
Rathpiseth_debar.pdf>.
141. James W Adams, “World Bank’s anti-corruption work in Cambodia,” Commentary, (15
October 2007), online: <go.worldbank.org/7JE5PD0PL0>.
142. The Fiduciary Review is part of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for Cambodia
in order to promote transparency and accountability of (and, therefore, enhance) the
governance environment. See The World Bank, Press Release, 2006/085/EAP, “The Royal
Government Of Cambodia And The World Bank Release Summary Report And Action
Plan Aimed At Reducing Fiduciary Risks” (16 September 2005), online: <go.worldbank.org/
AI5WFBL6J0>; The World Bank, “Cambodia: Summary of Fiduciary Review” (2007) at 1,
online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/FiduciarySummary.pdf>
[“Fiduciary Review”].
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assisted the government of Cambodia in identifying some weaknesses in a number
of governmental offices and helped devise an action plan for the government to
reduce the opportunities for future corruption. Within the scope of this joint
exercise, several projects were scrutinized and sufficient evidence was found to
substantiate allegations of fraud and corruption in seven of those projects.143
The evidence showed that procurement procedures of the project agreements
were not strictly obeyed, many contractors had bribed government officials, and
the projects’ financial management systems and audit requirements had control
issues and therefore could not reveal important breakdowns or irregularities.144 In
light of these results, the World Bank and the government of Cambodia agreed
on several actions, such as strengthening procurement mechanisms in project
design and implementation, identifying specific anti-corruption measures as part
of project preparation, and introducing Standard Operating Procedures in order
to improve project management practices.145
In June 2006, while conducting a further in-depth review of World
Bank-financed projects, INT found that three of the ongoing projects mentioned
above still had corruption-related problems.146 As a consequence, the World Bank
cancelled approximately 2.5 billion USD of funds for the three projects. The
government of Cambodia had to agree to repay the amount of the cancelled
project funds plus interest and to strengthen its efforts in fighting corruption.
These efforts included the incorporation of legally binding anti-corruption plans,
the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Working Group, and the enhancement
of Cambodia’s investigative capacity with the assistance of the World Bank.147
Though the suspension of disbursements may have been perceived as a drastic
action, the World Bank had no other recourse to address the significant impact

143. The investigated projects were: Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project
(BPAMP), Flood Emergency and Rehabilitation (FERP), Agricultural Productivity
Improvement Project (APIP), Forestry Concession Management and Control Pilot Project
(FCMCPP), Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP), Provincial and
Rural Infrastructure Project (PRIP), and Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project
(PPWSP). See The World Bank, Press Release, “Cambodia: World Bank Releases New
Statement and Update” (6 June 2006), online: <go.worldbank.org/SMMHI1V940>.
144. “Fiduciary Review,” supra note 140.
145. Ibid.
146. IMF, Asia and Pacific Department, Cambodia: Staff Report for the 2007 Article IV
Consultation, Country Report No 07/290 (Washington: IMF, 2007), online: <www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07290.pdf>.
147. The World Bank, “World Bank Lifts Suspension of Projects” (7 February 2007), online: <go.
worldbank.org/CDMB9JW7U0>.
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of this corruption on development.148 Moreover, the suspension of disbursements
proved to be beneficial. During the ensuing period, the government undertook
the required actions and, subsequently, the World Bank lifted the suspension for
the three projects.
B. AREAS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS AND MDBS’ FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION:
SMES AND LARGE MULTINATIONALS

The two cases described above demonstrate the type of corruption that concerns
MDBs. That is, corruption that affects development projects, for the most part
implemented by local government agencies. What is interesting to note in both
cases is that the corporations involved were SMEs. In fact, between 2008 and
2012, SMEs and individuals added up to approximately 90 per cent of all entities
debarred at the World Bank.149 Most of these debarred enterprises were located in
developing countries, which the World Bank refers to as Part II Countries.150 The
remaining, almost 10 per cent of debarred companies, were large multinationals.151
During the same period, 100 per cent of companies debarred by the IDB were
148. For example, by providing land titles to people in order to achieve a certain degree of income
security, repairing and constructing more than four hundred kilometers of roads, and
expanding the access to rural areas. Moreover, poor people are disproportionately affected by
corruption because they are more reliant on public services, and they therefore suffer more
because of corrupt officials and practices. See The World Bank, Press Release, “Cambodia:
World Bank Releases New Statement and Update” (6 June 2006), online: <go.worldbank.
org/SMMHI1V940>.
149. In the World Bank’s review process, there was concern for the fact that the majority of
sanctioned firms at the first tier of review were SMEs that would not only fail to contest
the charges but would also fail to engage in the process. The study conducted by the World
Bank found that “the majority of cases resolved at the first tier (92%) have resulted not
from an exchange of views at the first tier but by a ‘default’ by Respondents failing to engage
the system in any way, either by providing an Explanation to OSD or to appeal the case
to the SB. Most of these defaults involve small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
form part of a larger pattern of non-engagement by SMEs in the system.” See The World
Bank Group, Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions Regime 2011-2014: Phase 1 Review:
Stock-Taking, online: <consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/
consultation-review-world-bank-group-sanctions-systemopenconsultationtemplate/materials/
sanctionsreview_initiatingdiscussionbrief.pdf>.
150. The World Bank, A guide to the World Bank, 3rd ed (Washington: World Bank, 2011),
online: <openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2342/638430PUB0Exto00
Box0361527B0PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
151. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Progress and Its Recent
Reforms (Washington: World Bank, 2012) at 38, online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsProcess.pdf>.
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SMEs.152 The above numbers exemplify the reality of fighting corruption by both
MDBs while addressing the roots of the problem. In this respect, it is important
to note that SMEs account for 90 per cent of businesses and more than 50 per
cent of employment globally and more than 94 per cent of businesses in Latin
America and the Caribbean.153 Thus, SMEs are one of the main engines of growth
in developing countries. In addition, 25 per cent of the MDB-sanctioned parties
are individuals.154 Still, the fact remains that within the 75 per cent of sanctioned
corporations, the majority are SMEs.
These data support the conclusion that MDBs are interested in individuals
and corporations that participate in MDB-financed activities. These individual
consultants and local corporations (SMEs) have the in situ expertise to perform
services or provide goods and works related to development projects. Both the
projects and the performance of individuals and corporations in providing goods
and services have a direct effect on the ground in countries that the MDBs serve.
All these projects have the objective of improving people’s lives by increasing their
access to multiple services, enhancing their opportunities for self-sufficiency,
and establishing a stable environment, all of which are part of the development
objective that guides MDBs’ purpose.
In addition, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”)
has established that the smaller an enterprise is, the more likely it will be subject to
corruption and to perceive corruption as a major business obstacle.155 According
to the UNODC, the reasons for SMEs to engage in corrupt activities depend in
part on the environment in which they operate. SMEs participating in markets
152. The IDB debarred 195 companies in total from 2008 until 2012. See Inter-American
Development Bank, “Sanctioned Firms and Individuals” (2014), online: <www.iadb.org/en/
topics/transparency/integrity-at-the-idb-group/sanctioned-firms-and-individuals,1293.html>.
153. International Finance Corporation, Issue Brief, IFC and Small and Medium Enterprises
(2012), online: <www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/277d1680486a831abec2fff995bd23db/
AM11IFC+IssueBrief_SME.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>. See also Inter-American Development
Bank, News Release, “The IDB supports the internationalization of SMEs in the region
through a business roundtable and best practices programs” (2012), online: <www.iadb.org/
en/topics/trade/the-idb-supports-the-internationalization-of-smes-in-the-region-through-abusiness-roundtable-and-best-practices-programs,7005.html>.
154. The World Bank, “World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals” (2015), online:
<web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266&contentMDK=64069844&
menuPK=116730&pagePK=64148989&piPK=64148984>.
155. United Nations Industrial Development Organization & United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, Corruption prevention to foster small and medium-sized enterprise development,
vol 2 (Vienna: UNIDO & UNODC, 2012) at 1, online: <www.unodc.org/documents/
corruption/Publications/2012/Corruption_prevention_to_foster_small_and_medium_size_
enterprise_development_Vol_2.pdf>.
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where corruption is common have a slim chance of doing business successfully
without engaging in illegal practices.156 For this reason, it should come as no
surprise that the sanctions systems of MDBs handle more cases related to SMEs
than to large multinational corporations. The number of SMEs intricately related
to development work in member countries is significantly higher than that of
large multinational corporations. Although, as noted earlier, MDBs keep a
keen eye on the actions of large multinationals in member countries, as in the
case of SNC-Lavalin, and these cases make up a small portion of the MDBs’
sanctioned entities.
The MDBs have established a menu of administrative sanctions to be
imposed on respondents. Based on the sanctioning guidelines, the MDBs
may choose from a number of sanctions, including reprimand, debarment,
conditional non-debarment, and debarment with conditional release. These
sanctions’ objective is to deter wrongdoing on the part of corporations and
individuals and to protect the projects financed by the MDBs in order to fulfill
their development objectives. All this within the understanding that corruption
undermines development projects and MDBs can protect project beneficiaries
and stakeholders through preventive and sanctioning actions.157
In contrast, national enforcement systems such as the US DOJ and SEC are
more inclined to pursue FCPA cases in relation to multinational corporations
like Siemens, Ralph Lauren, Tyco, Hewlett Packard, and ALCOA. As earlier
explained, the FCPA was born out of the corrupt actions of some large US
corporations abroad. Its expansion to the OECD through the OECD Convention
was catalyzed by complaints of some US corporations of the lack of a “level playing
field” generated by the same FCPA. These corporations requested action by US
authorities to protect their commercial interests abroad by inviting other nations
to adopt similar norms to the FCPA. Therefore, the enforcement of the FCPA
and similar norms in other countries like Canada follows the path of “levelling
the playing field,” although in the case of Canada, as described in the decision of
Justice Hackland, with some concern for the effects of corruption in the affected
country. This historical development informs in part the enforcement of national
laws against foreign bribery.

156. Ibid at 2.
157. Alexandra Webster, “Multilateral development bank sanctions: the real worst case scenario?”
(18 December 2014), online: Simmons & Simmons elexica <www.elexica.com/en/
legal-topics/crime-fraud-and-investigations/16-multilateral-development-bank-sanctions-thereal-worst-case-scenario>.
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In fact, the proceedings conducted by the SEC have resulted in severe
punishments in the form of fines for corporations and sometimes imprisonment
for their legal representatives, CEOs, or staff.158 While the SEC has concentrated
on charging corporations, the DOJ prosecutes both individuals and entities. On
the one hand, all of the defendants charged and sanctioned by the SEC in 2013
were corporations. On the other hand, 63 per cent of DOJ enforcement actions
during 2013 were against individuals and 37 per cent against corporations.159
The fines imposed by the SEC are the outcome of either formal proceedings
or settlement agreements, depending on the firm’s willingness to cooperate with
the SEC.160 Companies like Alstom, Avon, Halliburton, and Pfizer have agreed
to pay millions of USD to settle SEC charges.161 Settlements reached between the
SEC and corporations usually have two components: a monetary penalty and
a compliance program. Compliance programs typically include the imposition
of extensive policies and procedures, training, vendor reviews, due diligence,
expense control, and escalation of red flags, among other things.162 As a result of
all SEC enforcement actions, corporations have not only paid several penalties
but also have significantly increased the amount of money spent on compliance
programs.163 As mentioned earlier, these settlements have resulted in payment
of large sums to the US government, but this money has not made its way to
countries that were the beneficiaries of the contracts or agreements upon which
bribes were paid.

158. Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Litigation: Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement” (March 2006), online: <www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/
Publications/2006/03/Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement/Files/
View-Full-Text/FileAttachment/LIT_032706.pdf>.
159. Gibson Dunn, “2013 Year-End FCPA Update” (6 January 2014) at 9, online: <www.
gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2013-Year-End-FCPA-Update.pdf>.
160. Joseph W Yockey, “FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the ‘Culture of Compliance’”
(2012) 2012:2 Wis L Rev 689 at 699.
161. Kenneth Winer & Manda Sertich, “Assessing the Power of the SEC to Impose Monetary
Penalties In Administrative Proceedings Charging Violations of the FCPA” (13 June 2011),
FCPA Professor (blog), online: <www.fcpaprofessor.com/assessing-the-power-of-the-sec-toimpose-monetary-penalties-in-administrative-proceedings-charging-violations-of-the-fcpa>.
162. Blank Rome Counselors at Law, “SEC FCPA Settlements Sends Wake-Up call to Small
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article highlights the great difference between national enforcement of
foreign bribery laws by the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and
international enforcement by MDBs, on the other. While national jurisdictions
are keen on sanctioning individuals and corporations for their wrongdoing, there
seems to be little evidence of restitution to the real victims of the corrupt practices
in developing countries. So far, the evidence suggests that if bribes were paid by a
corporation or individual subject to the US or Canadian jurisdictions, in relation
to a contract or dealing in a developing country, the penalties imposed as a result
of the proceedings or settlement agreement are not directed at restituting the
harm done to the affected developing country or the specific communities. And
this may be explained because the foreign bribery laws were created primarily
to protect the markets of the countries that enacted such laws—primarily the
United States. Under such a proposition, in the case of the United States, the
affected parties in any foreign bribery scheme would be the US market, the US
government, and its people.
On the opposite side, MDBs’ main concern is development in the countries
they serve. As such, the sanctions systems were created to serve this objective and
to root out corruption in developing projects while assisting member countries
in strengthening governance. The sanctions imposed by MDBs are aimed
at avoiding contracting with corporations that or individuals who engage in
prohibited practices while at the same time collaborating with national entities in
addressing areas in which there could be governance challenges, as was the case in
Cambodia. On the other hand, MDBs’ interest in investigating and sanctioning
corruption lies in the effects that it has on development projects and the poor.
Corruption affects the most vulnerable communities, which are the ones that
MDBs are trying to assist through development projects. These development
projects tend for the most part to engage SMEs, which comprise the majority of
corporations worldwide and are a significant source of development. It is for this
reason that the MDBs’ sanctions systems deal with a significant number of SMEs.
Although this is an apparent point of divergence between national authorities
such as the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and the MDBs, on the
other, it could also prove to be an area of convergence. Both systems look at
different aspects of the same problem. Foreign bribery involves actions in multiple
jurisdictions and affects multiple parties. It affects and distorts the markets in
which large multinationals operate and generates pervasive advantages to those
companies that indulge in bribery. It has devastating effects on the communities
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that need the assistance the most while challenging local governance structures.
However, national systems and MDBs see different angles of the actions of
wrongdoers and could benefit in continuing the pursuit of complementary
enforcement actions, as in the case of SNC-Lavalin. In addition, the affected
developing nations could benefit from the proceeds of the large fines imposed by
national enforcement agencies in foreign bribery cases, money that could serve
to strengthen local governance and, hence, level the international playing field.

